Enforce downscoping in token exchange for agent-to-agent calls
A Keycloak lab for A2A agents: the token B gets for C follows B's own scopes, not A's, unless you enforce downscoping. Stock run, control run and the fix.
AI agents call APIs for people and sometimes on their own. That raises plain IAM questions: who is the agent, what may it do, and who approved it. These posts and labs cover ID-JAG and Cross App Access, MCP authorization, token exchange and managed identities, and each one is tested in a lab where I can.
The browser tools below help while you read: they decode an ID-JAG, a JWT or a DPoP proof without sending anything anywhere.
No posts in this audience.
A Keycloak lab for A2A agents: the token B gets for C follows B's own scopes, not A's, unless you enforce downscoping. Stock run, control run and the fix.
My reading of the IETF 127 OAuth and WIMSE sessions: ID-JAG, the Workload Authorization Grant, transaction tokens and actors, with draft revisions.
GitHub's default OIDC sub now carries owner and repo IDs, Entra wildcard credentials are still in preview, and WorkOS shipped agent auth. Sources and dates.
How ID-JAG and Cross App Access let a company's identity provider approve AI agent access to other apps, with lab screenshots and the draft's current status.
On 18 November 2026 TechCrunch reported that Citi, PNC and other US banks now treat a third-party AI agent's actions as the customer's. What the new terms say.
Microsoft researchers showed in a controlled lab that one approved device code could hand an attacker an AI coding assistant session. Risks and mitigations.
On 17 November 2026 Microsoft showed in a lab that one approved device code can hand an attacker an AI coding assistant. What it is, and what to tell staff.
Lab in a test tenant: device-code sign-in, an agent API exchanging the token on-behalf-of with a certificate and no secret, and an unconsented scope failing.
A hands-on lab with Keycloak: an MCP server exchanges a user's token for a narrower one for a downstream API, then three bad exchanges are refused.
A lab with the official MCP Python SDK and Keycloak: the 401 handshake, audience checks, an RFC 8693 exchange for the payments API, and a refused passthrough.
Lab: a Container App agent with a user-assigned managed identity and no secrets gets one narrow app role, receives an app-only token, and the API validates it.